TODAY.
I posted this elsewhere but its worth considering here on this day:
One of the most amazing things that almost no one today realizes it that, while the attack was a tactical success, it was a stratigic failure! Their main targets, the American aircraft carriers, were not there and hence survived, the primary ships sunk were the battleships, which were already by 1941 technically outdated and stratigicly obsolete, air power and the ability to project it over enemy territory was the new superiority, also the Japanese pilots got so caught up in attacking whatever high visibility targets they could find like the battlewagons and the parked planes on Ford Island that they ignored a primary part of their orders, which was to bomb the aviation and naval fuel depots and storage tanks and to bomb and destroy the navies huge drydock repair facilities. Once the Japanese had withdrawn the Americans were still able to quickly fuel and put up air cover with the remaining undamaged planes, fuel and quickly put to sea ships that escaped and effectivley blockade the island from any further attack, and in the months that followed they were able to relatively quickly repair damaged ships thanks to the undamaged drydocks. The missing American aircraft carriers proved instrumental in Japanese defeats soon after, first in the Coral Sea and then devastatingly so just a short 6 months after Dec 7 at Midway Island, where the bulk of the Japan’s carrier strike force capability was destroyed, Japan was put on the defensive ever since. Shortly before the Dec 7 attack Admiral Yamamoto was asked if Hawaii was struck could he keep control of the seas, he replied " I can raise havoc for six months, after that I guarantee nothing" words that proved amazingly prophetic.
To add to that. It was said that the Japanese fleet knew the carriers were not in port, after receiving an updated spy report hours before their first launch. Yamamoto wanted to delay or even call off the attack, but he was far too committed to stop the attack and he also was under a lot of pressure from the Japanese government to proceed with the attack.
Just to add to the above.
I was sent this by Email today.
I don’t know how much is true or false
but it makes an interesting read.
Really interesting, and I never knew this little bit of history:
Tour boats ferry people out to the USS Arizona Memorial in Hawaii every thirty minutes. We just missed a ferry and had to wait thirty minutes… I went into a small gift shop to kill time. In the gift shop, I purchased a small book entitled, “Reflections on Pearl Harbor” by Admiral Chester Nimitz.
Sunday, December 7th, 1941–Admiral Chester Nimitz was attending a concert in Washington D.C. He was paged and told there was a phone call for him. When he answered the phone, it was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on the phone. He told Admiral Nimitz that he (Nimitz) would now be the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.
Admiral Nimitz flew to Hawaii to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. He landed at Pearl Harbor on Christmas Eve, 1941. There was such a spirit of despair, dejection and defeat–you would have thought the Japanese had already won the war. On Christmas Day, 1941, Adm. Nimitz was given a boat tour of the destruction wrought on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese… Big sunken battleships and navy vessels cluttered the waters every where you looked.
As the tour boat returned to dock, the young helmsman of the boat asked, “Well Admiral, what do you think after seeing all this destruction?” Admiral Nimitz’s reply shocked everyone within the sound of his voice. Admiral Nimitz said, “The Japanese made three of the biggest mistakes an attack force could ever make, or God was taking care of America. Which do you think it was?”
Shocked and surprised, the young helmsman asked, “What do mean by saying the Japanese made the three biggest mistakes an attack force ever made?” Nimitz explained:
Mistake number one : the Japanese attacked on Sunday morning. Nine out of every ten crewmen of those ships were ashore on leave. If those same ships had been lured to sea and been sunk–we would have lost 38,000 men instead of 3,800.
Mistake number two : when the Japanese saw all those battleships lined in a row, they got so carried away sinking those battleships, they never once bombed our dry docks opposite those ships. If they had destroyed our dry docks, we would have had to tow every one of those ships to America to be repaired. As it is now, the ships are in shallow water and can be raised. One tug can pull them over to the dry docks, and we can have them repaired and at sea by the time we could have towed them to America. And I already have crews ashore anxious to man those ships.
Mistake number three : every drop of fuel in the Pacific theater of war is in top of the ground storage tanks five miles away over that hill. One attack plane could have strafed those tanks and destroyed our fuel supply. That’s why I say the Japanese made three of the biggest mistakes an attack force could make or God was taking care of America.
I’ve never forgotten what I read in that little book. It is still an inspiration as I reflect upon it. In jest, I might suggest that because Admiral Nimitz was a Texan, born and raised in Fredricksburg, Texas --he was a born optimist. But anyway you look at it–Admiral Nimitz was able to see a silver lining in a situation and circumstance where everyone else saw only despair and defeatism.
President Roosevelt had chosen the right man for the right job. We desperately needed a leader that could see silver linings in the midst of the clouds of dejection, despair and defeat.
There is a reason that our national motto is, IN GOD WE TRUST .
Yamamoto also said ‘We have awakened a sleeping giant’.
More prophetic words.
tac, ig & The St John Bridge Boys
tac said:
Yamamoto also said 'We have awakened a sleeping giant'.More prophetic words.
tac, ig & The St John Bridge Boys
He was referring to the anger over the Japanese embassies final message, not being delivered to the US Government not one hour before the attack, but a half hour after the attack had begun, this was due to a serious bureacratical error on the Japanese Embassy. The last parts of the coded communiques were only allowed to be decoded and translated by staff that possessed the highest clearence, and most of the staff was already off on Sunday when the final part arrived, in other words the rank and file clerical employees that normally would handle the uncoding of normal communiques and then type up the uncoded communications were banned from from doing so over fears of a leak, and the one person in the clerical staff who did have the clearences was not a skilled typist, so it literally took hours longer to uncode and then type onto the embassies official letterhead the official document that was presented to Admiral Hull on Sunday afternoon Dec 7 DC time. The Japanese Ambassador siad that while they knew from uncoding the messages that the Japanese were going to break off negotiations but they had absolutely no idea there was going to be an attack, although the one practically ensured the other.
From Wikipedia:
After World War II, Nomura denied that he knew beforehand of the attack.[4] Reportedly Nomura and Kurusu had to personally decode the radioed message of Japan’s breaking off the negotiations with the United States (which given the circumstances practically meant war), as it had been sent from Japan on Monday, December 8 and was received when the embassy’s technical support staff was still on Sunday holiday. Nomura stated that this is why he had been unable to deliver the message until after the actual attack had taken place.[5] In his memoirs, Hull credited Nomura with having been sincere in trying to prevent war between Japan and the USA.[6]
70 years later and the history is still rivitting to study.
I would have to agree with you Vic. Although I prefer to look into our history around the Revolutionary War, I still like to read about other times in our history.
My topic of study of late continues to be the Pacific War, a while ago I read “At War with the Wind” about Japans kamakaze offensive. I’m almost done reading “Halsey’s Typhoon” about the events in Dec 44 about Halsey’s Third Fleet running straight into a huge typhoon (codename: Cobra)off the Phillipeans, 3 ships lost, dozens damaged and almost 900 men lost. The fact behind why it happened are really surprising and tragic. Next up, “Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors” about the Battle of Samar, part of the end of the larger Battle of Leyte Gulf where Halsey got tricked into following a decoy Japanese carrier task force and leaving the northern flank of the invasion area vulnerable with only a force of small destroyers, small escort carriers and assault ships (LSTs with extra guns) to fight off a much larger Japanese battleship task force. Its been often referred to as the US Navies finest hour.
(http://www.mighty90.com/images/1944_12_17_circa_langley_cvl-27_700x_1k0o.jpg)
perhapd one the most amazing pics taken during Typhoon Cobra, yes- thats an aircraft carrier
Regarding mistakes numbers two and three… that was typical of the Japanese during Big 2, and to some extent typical of all warriors. The Bushido Code mandated that it was more honorable to attack another warrior, i.e. a warship, than it was to attack an auxiliary ship, or supply depot, so given the choice, the pilots almost always attacked the warships.
It is a loosely held secret that it is the Supply Officer, not the Warrior, who wins the war.
I thing they still teach that at the Command and Staff College, at least, I hope they do.
To emphasize how much the roll really was, I have leveled the horizon. The Photographer’ Mate was hanging on for dear life, trying to stand upright and make sure that he didn’t go over the side, so he really didn’t worry to much about keeping his horizon level. Been there, done that. That is only about 30 degrees or so, well within the carrier’s capacity. Aboard USS McClusky, (FFG-41) I witnessed a 54 degree roll, one degree shy of it’s design 55 degree limit. We had all 4 sweat pumps on line, with a pucker factor of 10/10.
“It is a loosely held secret that it is the Supply Officer, not the Warrior, who wins the war.”
I think Erwin Rommel found that out the hard way Steve.
There is plenty of evidence to suggest a third wave was indeed planned to destroy both the fuel depot and dry-docks but it never occurred. Some say Yamamoto got cold feet but more likely it was the delays in preparing the aircraft for a third attack that would have the planes landing at night. Night landings on a carrier at that time were extremely dangerous.
An interesting and little known story of WWII…”Koga’s Zero”. A record of recovering a nearly intact Zero in the Aleutians early in the war. You can usually find a copy cheap on ebay.
Koga’s Zero is an interseting read. I have read it. I’m no “swabby” I prefered to play in the mud where the ground was solid under me. But if my ship rolled as much as that huge carrier…I probably would have had a pucker factor of 20/10
Jake, you really can’t call yourself a sailor unless you have walked on the bulkheads (walls to you landlubbers).